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A key problem in studying a hypothesized spectrum of severity of delusional ideation is determining that
ideas are unfounded. The first objective was to use virtual reality to validate groups of individuals with
low, moderate, and high levels of unfounded persecutory ideation. The second objective was to
investigate, drawing upon a cognitive model of persecutory delusions, whether clinical and nonclinical
paranoia are associated with similar causal factors. Three groups (low paranoia, high nonclinical
paranoia, persecutory delusions) of 30 participants were recruited. Levels of paranoia were tested using
virtual reality. The groups were compared on assessments of anxiety, worry, interpersonal sensitivity,
depression, anomalous perceptual experiences, reasoning, and history of traumatic events. Virtual reality
was found to cause no side effects. Persecutory ideation in virtual reality significantly differed across the
groups. For the clear majority of the theoretical factors there were dose–response relationships with levels
of paranoia. This is consistent with the idea of a spectrum of paranoia in the general population.
Persecutory ideation is clearly present outside of clinical groups and there is consistency across the
paranoia spectrum in associations with important theoretical variables.
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An emerging literature focuses on the clinically important ex-
perience of persecutory delusions (see Freeman, Bentall, & Garety,
2008). Similar to the occurrence of emotional disorders, the delu-
sions seen in psychiatric services are likely to be at the severe end
of a spectrum of such phenomena in the general population (e.g.,
Chapman & Chapman, 1980; Claridge, 1997; van Os, Linscott,
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009); mistrust, sus-
piciousness, worries about threats from others, persecutory ideas,
and persecutory delusions may be related. However, there is an
underlying difficulty to work in this area: knowing that the ide-
ation is unfounded. Such judgments can seem easier in clinical
cases where the content is (sometimes) implausible but they be-
come much more difficult lower down the spectrum; for instance,
it is difficult to know whether fears about hostility from the
neighbors are unrealistic or when mistrust of work colleagues is
excessive. In this unique article the experience of persecutory
ideation was validated in an experimental test.
The solution developed for determining the occurrence of un-
founded persecutory ideation is exposure to neutral virtual reality
social environments (see review by Freeman, 2008). Virtual reality
is an interactive computer-generated environment. Its attraction
lies in the tendency for individuals to react in virtual reality as they
would in the real-life situation (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005).
Paranoid responses in the virtual reality social environments must
be unfounded, as the computer characters are programmed to
behave neutrally. No matter what a person does, the characters will
remain neutral in their responses. It is therefore an excellent
laboratory test of paranoid ideation. In the first studies the occur-
rence of persecutory ideation in virtual reality was established with
students (Freeman et al., 2003, 2005), individuals at high risk of
psychosis (Valmaggia et al., 2007), and individuals with persecu-
tory delusions (Fornells-Ambrojo et al., 2008). The potential of the
methodology to advance theoretical understanding was then dem-
onstrated by the identification in a large general population sample
of psychological factors predictive of paranoia (Freeman, Gittins,
et al., 2008; Freeman, Pugh, et al., 2008). In this new study we set
out to test three groups varying along the paranoia continuum:
individuals with low levels of paranoia, individuals with high
nonclinical paranoia, and individuals with persecutory delusions. It
was predicted that individuals with clinical delusions would have
a higher level of persecutory ideation in virtual reality than indi-
viduals with nonclinical paranoia, who, in turn, would be more
suspicious than individuals low in paranoia. Potential adverse
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zzzPsgiolePfrpeffects (e.g., nausea) of spending time in virtual reality were also
monitored for each group.
Epidemiological studies indicated the presence of a psychosis
continuum by establishing that delusions and hallucinations are not
confined to psychotic groups (e.g., Eaton, Romanoski, Anthony, &
Nestadt, 1991; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000) and that the
risk of clinical disorder is raised by the earlier occurrence of
low-level symptoms (Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckbald, &
Zinser, 1994; Dominguez, Wichers, Lieb, Wittchen, & van Os,
2009; Poulton et al., 2000). The continuum perspective also leads
to an important prediction: Low-level psychotic-like experiences
and clinical symptoms should be understandable in terms of sim-
ilar factors. This has been termed etiological continuity (Myin-
Germeys, Krabbendam, & van Os, 2003). The epidemiological
studies, consistent with this prediction, find that clinical and non-
clinical psychotic experiences have similar associations with de-
mographic and social variables such as age, sex, urbanicity, and
cannabis use (see review by van Os et al., 2009). Researchers in
the Netherlands have also examined single psychological vari-
ables, such as theory of mind and attributional style, across a
hypothesized positive symptom continuum (e.g., Janssen et al.,
2006; Vermissen et al., 2008). Typically a dose–response relation-
ship is shown between a putative causal factor and position along
the psychosis continuum. In the current study the focus is on
paranoid experiences: A cognitive model of persecutory delusions
was used to test potential similarities in causal factors across the
paranoia spectrum.
The threat anticipation model (Freeman, 2007; Freeman &
Freeman, 2008; Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowlers, & Beb-
bington, 2002) identifies multiple causes of paranoid thinking
(see Figure 1), but the following are particularly important: af-
fective processes, especially anxiety, worry, and interpersonal sen-
sitivity; anomalous experiences, such as hallucinations and per-
ceptual anomalies; reasoning biases, particularly jumping to
conclusions and belief inflexibility; and social factors, such as
adverse events and environments. It is hypothesized that at a time
of stress the individual experiences a changed (and confusing)
anomalous internal state (e.g., perceptual disturbances occur). In
essence, the person feels different and this needs an explanation. A
negative affective state makes a threatening interpretation likely:
Anxiety leads to the anticipation of danger; interpersonal sensitiv-
ity highlights the potential threat from other people; and engage-
ment in worry results in more negative, implausible ideas. Para-
noid explanations are particularly likely in the context of previous
experience of adverse events such as victimization. The fears reach
a delusional level of conviction when reasoning biases, such as
“jumping to conclusions,” are present. In the current study each of
these model components was examined in the groups assessed in
virtual reality. It was predicted that dose–response relationships
would be found across the three groups for the presence of anom-
alous internal experiences, jumping to conclusions, anxiety, inter-
personal sensitivity, worry, and history of trauma. These putative
causal factors would be increasingly present as paranoia levels
increase.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
EVENTS 
Internal: arousal, anomalous 
experiences, core cognitive dysfunction 
External: Discrepant, negative, socially 
significant, or ambiguous events. 
EMOTION 
Anxiety. Worry, Interpersonal 
sensitivity (negative beliefs 
about self and others). 
SEARCH FOR MEANING 
Search for understanding/meaning 
Not wanting to talk to others/having 
nobody to provide feedback on ideas.  
THE PERSECUTORY 
(THREAT) BELIEF 
TRIGGER 
Major life events, on-going stress, sleep 
disturbance, trauma, illicit drugs. 
REASONING 
Jumping to conclusions, 
confirmation bias, failure to 
consider alternatives. 
Figure 1. Outline of factors involved in persecutory delusion development.
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Participants
A low nonclinical paranoia group (n  30), a high nonclinical
paranoia group (n  30), and a persecutory delusions group (n 
30) were tested. All participants were required to be within the
ages of 18 to 65 and to be able to read and write in English. For
the nonclinical groups there was a screening stage to identify
members of the general public high and low in paranoid thinking.
Sixty thousand leaflets advertising the study were distributed to
local postcodes. The text of the leaflet headed “Virtual Reality
Research at King’s College London” was as follows:
Virtual reality is a computer-generated world that you can walk
around in. In research taking place in Denmark Hill, we are studying
people’s reactions in virtual reality. We are looking for adult volun-
teers. Participation in the research would take 90 minutes for which
you would be paid £20. The research has been approved by an ethics
committee. If you are interested in taking part then find out more by
telephoning or e-mailing.
A total of 291 individuals made contact. Thirteen individuals could
not be recontacted, 6 people changed their minds about participat-
ing, 10 individuals were excluded for having a history of treatment
for severe mental illness (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder),
and 4 other individuals did not meet entry criteria. The 258 eligible
respondents were then asked to complete several questionnaires
(so that the focus on paranoia was not easily discernible). A total
of 202 people returned fully completed questionnaires. The par-
ticipants were selected on the basis of their level of persecutory
thinking in the past month as assessed by the 16-item Green et al.
(2008) Paranoid Thought Scale (G-PTS)—Part B, which can have
scores ranging between 16 and 80. The 202 participants had a
mean score of 20.1 (SD  8.6, range 57, mode  16, median 
17). Almost half of the sample (49%) scored at the bottom of this
scale, indicating the absence of persecutory thinking in the past
month. The low paranoia group were required to score 16 on this
measure, indicating the absence of persecutory thinking. The high
nonclinical paranoia group were required to score 21 or above; this
cutoff selects the top 20% of the study respondents on the measure
(and the top half of those endorsing paranoia items). We aimed to
match the nonclinical groups with the clinical group for age and
sex. The clinical group were recruited from adult psychiatric
services at the South London and Maudsley National Health Ser-
vice (NHS) Foundation Trust. The entry criteria were the presence
of a current persecutory delusion, which met the criteria of Free-
man and Garety (2000), and a clinical diagnosis of schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, or delusional disorder. The presence of a
persecutory delusion was established using the Present State Ex-
amination—10 (World Health Organization, 1992). The case-note
diagnoses of those recruited were schizophrenia (n  24), schizo-
affective disorder (n  4), and delusional disorder (n  2).
Antipsychotic medication data were converted into chlorproma-
zine equivalents grouped into low (0–200 mg), medium (200–400
mg), and high (400 mg); 1 person was not taking any medica-
tion, 11 were on a low dose, 14 were on a medium dose, and 4
were on a high dose. As would be expected, the three groups
clearly differed on the self-report G-PTS (see Table 1). There were
significant differences for ideas of reference, F(2, 97)  77.39,
p  .001, and persecutory ideation, F(2, 87)  194.33, p  .001.
The groups significantly differed from each other on each of the
scales (p  .001).
Virtual Reality
The equipment, environment, and procedure were identical to
that reported by Freeman, Pugh, et al. (2008). The head-mounted
display was a Virtual Research VR1280 (Virtual Research Sys-
tems, Aptos, CA), which has a resolution of 1280  1024 pixels
in each eye, a 60° diagonal field of view, and a refresh rate of 60
Hz. The tracking system used was the InterSense IS900
(InterSense Inc., Billerica, MA). The tracker uses a hybrid of
inertial and ultrasonic sensors to determine the orientation and
position of the user during the simulation. The sensors were laid
out in a ceiling constellation grid above the user. The tracker data
were accessed by a Virtual Reality Peripheral Network (VRPN)
IS900 server (Taylor et al., 2001).
The virtual reality environment comprised a 4-min journey
between two stops on a visual and auditory simulation of a London
Underground train which was populated by computer characters
(see Figure 2). The Distributed Immersive Virtual Environment
(DIVE) software platform was used to create the overall scenario
(Frecon, Smith, Steed, Stenius, & Stahl, 2001). Both the train shell
and the computer characters (avatars) were created using 3D
Studio Max (Autodesk, San Rafael, CA). The avatar motions were
made using an optical motion capture system. Each avatar had its
own background motion that repeated throughout the scenario.
Each avatar had one motion that approximated their breath and
Table 1
Levels of Paranoia Across the Groups
Variable
Low paranoia
(n  30)
High nonclinical
paranoia (n  30)
Persecutory
delusions (n  30)
M SD M SD M SD
G-PTS—Part A (ideas of reference) 19.17 4.14 32.17 10.82 53.73 14.84
G-PTS—Part B (persecutory ideation) 16.00 0.00 32.97 10.40 65.27 13.49
Virtual reality assessments
State Social Paranoia Scale 10.93 1.87 13.10 5.17 19.73 10.40
How paranoid did you feel on the tube? 0.86 1.36 2.84 2.98 3.64 3.87
How hostile did you think the people on the tube were? 0.92 1.99 1.77 1.90 2.68 3.20
Note. G-PTS  Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scale.
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addition, several of the avatars responded to participants’ gaze by
looking in their direction, which was enabled through head track-
ing of the participants. When looked at, one particular avatar
would occasionally smile at the user. The audio for the scene,
comprising background tube noise and low-level snippets of con-
versation, was rendered in stereo, without spatialization, using a
Creative sound card.
Measures
All measures were completed before entering the virtual reality
environment. The exceptions were the State Social Paranoia Scale
(Freeman et al., 2007) and the Visual Analogue Scales, which
assess paranoid thinking in virtual reality, and were therefore
administered directly after the headset was removed. The Simula-
tor Sickness Questionnaire (Kennedy, Lane, Berbaum, & Lil-
ienthal, 1993) was repeated after the virtual train ride.
Paranoia
Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (G-PTS; Green et al.,
2008). The G-PTS is a 32-item measure of paranoid thinking
over the past month. Part A assesses ideas of reference (e.g., “It
was hard to stop thinking about people talking about me behind my
back”) and Part B assesses ideas of persecution (e.g., “I was
convinced there was a conspiracy against me”). Each item is rated
on a 5-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater levels of paranoid
thinking. The internal consistency of the scale and test–retest
reliability are good. Convergent validity has been shown with the
Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992).
State Social Paranoia Scale (SSPS; Freeman et al., 2007).
The SSPS was designed to assess paranoia in virtual reality. It has
10 persecutory items each rated on a 5-point scale (e.g., “Someone
stared at me in order to upset me,” “Someone was trying to isolate
me,” “Someone was trying to make me distressed”). The SSPS has
excellent internal reliability, adequate test–retest reliability, con-
vergent validity with both independent interviewer ratings and
self-report measures, and divergent validity in regards to measures
of positive and neutral thinking. Higher scores on the SSPS indi-
cate greater levels of persecutory thinking. In order to reduce
skew, the responses were grouped into six ordinal categories
(corresponding to scores of 10, 11–15, 16–20, 21–25, 26–30, and
30; as previously carried out by Freeman, Pugh, et al., 2008).
Visual Analogue Rating Scales. Participants marked on sep-
arate 10-cm lines the degree to which the people on the virtual
reality train were hostile and whether they had felt paranoid on the
train. Higher ratings indicate greater endorsement of the charac-
teristic.
Affective Processes
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovi-
bond, 1995). The DASS is a 42-item instrument with three
subscales measuring current symptoms of depression, anxiety, and
stress. Each of the subscales consists of 14 items with a 0–3 scale
(0  did not apply to me at all,3 applied to me very much).
Higher scores indicate higher levels of emotional distress. The
scale has been shown to be reliable and valid in large clinical and
nonclinical populations (Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow,
1997; Crawford & Henry, 2003; Page, Hooke, & Morrison, 2007).
The Anxiety and Depression subscales were used in the current
study.
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller,
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). The PSWQ is the most estab-
lished measure of trait worry style and has been used in nonclinical
and clinical populations (see review by Startup & Erickson, 2006).
Each of the 16 items are rated on a 5-point scale. Higher scores
indicate a greater tendency to worry.
Interpersonal sensitivity measure (Boyce & Parker, 1989).
This is a 36-item scale designed to assess interpersonal sensitivity,
defined as undue and excessive awareness of, and sensitivity to,
the behavior and feelings of others. Statements are rated on a
4-point scale (1  very unlike self,2 moderately unlike self,3
moderately like self,4 very like self). High scores indicate
greater interpersonal sensitivity. The psychometric properties of
the scale have been tested in nonclinical individuals, general
practice attenders, and psychiatric patients.
Reasoning
Beads task (Garety et al., 2005). Data gathering was assessed
with a probabilistic reasoning task that has been extensively used
with people who experience delusions (see reviews by Fine, Gard-
ner, Craigie, & Gold, 2007; Freeman, 2007; Garety & Freeman,
1999). Participants are asked to request as many pieces of evidence
(colored beads) as they would like before making a decision (from
Figure 2. The virtual reality equipment (top panel) and scenario (bottom
panel).
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beads of two different colors (orange and black) in opposite ratios
of 60:40. The key variable is the number of beads requested before
making a decision (and a lower number has been associated with
delusions).
Anomalous Experience
Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale (Bell, Halligan,
& Ellis, 2006). This 32-item questionnaire assesses perceptual
anomalies. It comprises nine subscales including sensory intensity,
distortion of the external world, sensory experience from an un-
explained source, sensory flooding, and hallucinations. A higher
score represents the reporting of a greater number of perceptual
anomalies. The scale also has three factor scores. The first factor,
Temporal Lobe Experience, contains items such as “Do you ever
see shapes, lights, or colors even though there is nothing really
there?” The second factor, Chemosensation, contains items such as
“Do you ever notice that food or drink seems to have an unusual
taste?” The third factor, Clinical Psychosis, contains items such as
“Do you ever hear voices commenting on what you are thinking or
doing?” The questionnaire was developed with clinical and non-
clinical groups and displayed good internal reliability, test–retest
reliability, and construct and criterion validity.
Social
Life Stressor Checklist (Wolfe & Kimerling, 1997). The
checklist asks respondents about the occurrence of a range of
severe life events (e.g., serious accident, physical attack, and
sexual abuse). If the respondent reports the occurrence of an event,
subsequent questions ask when the event happened, whether the
person thought at the time that serious harm or death could result,
and whether feelings of intense helplessness, fear, or horror oc-
curred. Only checklist items that referred to Criterion A events as
defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders (4th ed., text rev.; American Psychiatric Association, 2000)
were used. Only events that reached the severity criterion related
to posttraumatic stress disorder diagnosis were scored as occur-
ring. The total number of traumatic events was recorded. McHugo
et al. (2005) reported adequate test–retest reliability of the measure
in a sample of 200 women.
Side Effects
Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (Kennedy et al., 1993).
Particularly in the past, virtual reality was known to cause side
effects similar to motion sickness. Possible causes may have been
flicker, visual distortion, and the slow response of earlier systems
to participants’ movements. The 16-item Simulator Sickness Ques-
tionnaire, derived from a large factor analysis, assesses three
symptom clusters: oculomotor (e.g., blurred vision), disorientation
(e.g., dizziness), and nausea (e.g., vomiting). Each item is assessed
on a 4-point scale (from none to very strong). The total score is
weighted. Higher scores indicate a higher level of symptoms.
Intellectual Functioning
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Wechsler, 2001). The
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading provides an estimate of premorbid
intellectual functioning by asking participants to read a list of 50
words with irregular pronunciations.
Analysis
Analyses were carried out using SPSS Version 15.0 (SPSS,
2006) and Stata Version 10.0 (StataCorp, 2008). Group differences
for demographic variables were tested using one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) and, when appropriate, least significant dif-
ference planned comparisons. Ordinal logistic regressions (using
the Stata ologit command) were used to test differences in paranoia
in virtual reality. The main procedure for testing overall group
differences on the cognitive model measures was one-way
ANOVA; when significant these were then followed by least
significant difference pairwise comparisons (i.e., there was no
correction applied for multiple testing). Covariates were not used
(Miller & Chapman, 2001). There were no missing data for the
main analyses.
Results
Basic demographic information for the three groups is displayed
in Table 2. It can be seen that the groups were matched for sex and
marital status. There was a significant group difference in age, F(2,
87)  4.97, p  .009; the high nonclinical paranoia group was
younger than the two other groups (p  .01). The clinical group
had fewer individuals of White ethnicity compared with the low
paranoia group, 
2(1)  6.24, p  .012, and the high nonclinical
paranoia group, 
2(1)  3.59, p  .058. There was also a signif-
icant difference in intellectual functioning, F(2, 84)  4.31, p 
.017; the clinical group scored significantly lower than the low
paranoia group (p  .005) and tended to score lower than the high
nonclinical paranoia group (p  .057). The scores on the intel-
lectual functioning measure are consistent with the lower levels of
educational qualifications of the clinical group. The clinical group
were more likely to be unemployed than the low paranoia group,

2(1)  12.38, p  .001, and the high nonclinical paranoia group,

2(1)  19.81, p  .001. For computer game playing the low
paranoia group did not differ from either the clinical group,

2(1)  0.64, p  .426, or the high nonclinical paranoia group,

2(1)  1.11, p  .292.
Validation of the Groups
Group differences in persecutory ideation in virtual reality as
assessed by the SSPS were tested using ordinal logistic regression.
The persecutory delusions group was 12.51 times more likely than
the low paranoia group to be in a higher category of persecutory
ideation in virtual reality, p  .001, CI [4.20, 37.22]. This means,
for instance, that the delusions group was approximately 12 times
more likely to report paranoid ideation in virtual reality. The high
nonclinical paranoia group were 2.86 times more likely than the
low paranoia group to be in a higher category of persecutory
ideation in virtual reality, p  .044, CI [1.03, 7.96]. This means,
for instance, that the high nonclinical group were approximately 3
times more likely to report paranoid ideation in virtual reality.
When the ordinal regression for paranoia in virtual reality was
repeated with the high nonparanoia group as the reference cate-
gory, the clinical paranoia group were 4.37 times more likely to be
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the groups significantly differed from each other in levels of
unfounded persecutory ideation.
Side Effects: Simulator Sickness
Total weighted simulator sickness scores indicated that there
were no changes from pre- to postvirtual reality for the persecutory
delusions group (Time 1 M  67.34, SD  65.40; Time 2 M 
61.71, SD  65.20), the high nonclinical paranoia group (Time 1
M  17.45, SD  17.74; Time 2 M  22.19, SD  24.75), or the
low paranoia group (Time 1 M  5.24, SD  11.05; Time 2 M 
5.98, SD  13.77). A mixed-design ANOVA, with time as a
within-subjects factor and group as a between-subjects factor,
confirmed no significant main effect of time, F(1, 87)  0.01, p 
.984, or significant interaction between time and group, F(2, 87) 
1.58, p  .212. There was, however, a main effect of group, F(2,
87)  18.93, p  .001. The persecutory delusions group scored
higher on the Simulator Sickness Questionnaire than both of the
nonclinical groups (p  .001). This higher reporting by the psy-
chiatric group of symptoms such as headache, nausea, and dizzi-
ness—which was independent of being in virtual reality—may
reflect their generally higher levels of affective disturbance or side
effects of antipsychotic medication.
Cognitive Model Variables
Comparisons on the model measures, using one-way ANOVA
and least significant difference testing, are displayed in Table 3.
Increasing levels of paranoia across the three groups are clearly
associated with increases in anxiety, depression, interpersonal sen-
sitivity, anomalies of experience, and number of traumatic events.
(The difference in number of traumatic events between the low
paranoia and high nonclinical paranoia approached significance,
p  .052.) Only reduced data gathering is specific to the clinical
group.
The anomalous experiences questionnaire was examined further
because of the variety in types of perceptual anomalies. The three
factor scores and two of the subscales (one concerning hallucina-
tory experiences, the other concerning much milder anomalies)
were analyzed. There is a clear increase in the temporal lobe factor
score across the groups (see Table 3). A similar pattern is found for
the Clinical Psychosis factor, which was dichotomized because of
its skew. Ten (33%) individuals in the low paranoia group, 20
(67%) individuals in the high nonclinical paranoia group, and 26
(87%) individuals in the clinical group had at least one clinical
psychosis anomaly. The high nonclinical paranoia group, 
2(1) 
6.67, p  .010, and the clinical group, 
2(1)  17.78, p  .001,
were more likely to have clinical psychosis anomalies than the low
paranoia group. The high nonclinical paranoia group tended to
have a lower likelihood to experience such anomalies when com-
pared with the clinical group, 
2(1)  3.35, p  .067. A similar
pattern of results was found for the subscale concerning sensory
experience from an unexplained source. The relationships for the
Chemosensation factor and the Sensory Intensity subscale scores
were slightly different; the general pattern here was that the high
nonclinical paranoia group had the highest scores, which were
Table 2
Demographic Information
Variable
Low paranoia
(n  30)
High nonclinical
paranoia (n  30)
Persecutory
delusions (n  30)
Mean age (SD) 44.2 (11.2) 36.0 (11.7) 44.2 (11.7)
Mean IQ (SD)
a 101.8 (15.2) 98.3 (14.5) 91.2 (11.2)
Gender
Male 18 18 18
Female 12 12 12
Ethnicity
White 25 23 16
Black Caribbean 2 3 3
Black African 2 1 5
Black Other 1 0 3
Indian 0 1 1
Pakistani 0 0 0
Other 0 2 2
Marital status
Single, divorced or widowed 27 28 27
Married 3 2 3
Highest education level achieved
None/GCSE 10 5 16
AS/A Level 1 7 5
Diploma, degree or higher 19 18 9
Employment status
Never worked and long-term unemployed
b 76 2 2
Computer game use
Never 20 16 17
Played 10 14 13
Note. GCSE  General Certificate of Secondary Education. AS/A  Advanced Subsidiary/A level Exami-
nation.
a IQ data were unavailable for three clinical participants.
b Only partial employment data are presented.
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paranoia group.
Finally, all the variables (anxiety, worry, interpersonal sensitiv-
ity, depression, total number of anomalous experiences, beads
drawn, number of traumatic events) were considered together in an
ordinal logistic regression with group as the dependent variable;
the only significant predictors of the paranoia spectrum were
anxiety, odds ratio  1.21, p  .008, CI [1.05, 1.40], and number
of anomalous experiences, odds ratio  1.16, p  .006, CI [1.04,
1.29].
Discussion
Virtual reality proved to be a safe method of studying paranoia.
It was used to identify three groups: individuals with low levels of
persecutory ideation, individuals with nonclinical persecutory ide-
ation, and individuals with clinical persecutory delusions. This
provided the opportunity to examine the cognitive correlates of
persecutory delusions and the intriguing issue of whether the
persecutory ideation common in the general population is the
counterpart of the clinical phenomena. This process was informed
by theory: The groups were assessed on measures related to a
cognitive model of persecutory delusions. There was a consistency
in the results. Across the groups there was a step change in levels
of anxiety, worry, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anomalies
of experience, and trauma history. This pattern of results is ex-
pected if nonclinical and clinical paranoia are related experiences.
The particular associations across the groups are consistent with
the existing literature testing the cognitive model. A number of
studies have reported an association of paranoia with anxiety,
worry, and interpersonal sensitivity (e.g., Bassett, Sperlinger, &
Freeman, 2009; Freeman & Garety, 1999; Martin & Penn, 2001;
Startup, Freeman, & Garety, 2007). Paranoia may even be a type
of anxious fear (Freeman & Freeman, 2008). However, experi-
mental research indicates that anomalies of experience differenti-
ate persecutory ideation from anxiety (Freeman et al., 2005; Free-
man, Gittins, et al., 2008). In the current study anomalies of
experience were the second key factor associated with paranoia. It
should be recognized, however, that perceptual anomalies vary
greatly in severity. The milder anomalies, such as changes in levels
of sensory intensity (e.g., “Do you ever notice that sounds are
much louder than they normally would be?”), were associated with
paranoia, but their presence did not distinguish between clinical
and nonclinical instances. In contrast, the presence of more severe
anomalies, such as hallucinations, did discriminate between the
two paranoia groups. It is plausible that there is a qualitative shift
in the types of anomalous experiences associated with severe
instances of paranoia.
Indeed, even though the study provides further support for the
view that complete discontinuity between clinical and nonclinical
experiences is unlikely, the exact nature of a paranoia spectrum
remains to be established. Van Os and Verdoux (2003) described
how the shape of a delusion continuum in the general population
would depend on the number of causal factors, the differences in
their effect sizes, the degree to which they interact, and their
prevalence but argued that if there are a number of interacting
factors then it is unlikely that the distribution will be normal.
Instead the distribution in the general population is likely to be
skewed, with many people not having any delusional experiences
(i.e., quasicontinuous). Such skewness in the occurrence of perse-
cutory thinking was found in the current study’s screening sample.
It is of interest that in large epidemiological studies new statistical
methods are now being applied to understanding distributions of
psychological problems (e.g., Krueger, Markon, Patrick, Benning,
& Kramer, 2007). At an individual level there may be nonlinear
shifts into clinical disorder. Detailed analysis of potential differ-
ences in the content of clinical and nonclinical paranoia is also
required. Specific aspects of the content of persecutory thoughts
(e.g., beliefs about the power of the persecutor) relate to emotional
distress but have not been examined across the spectrum (Freeman,
Garety, & Kuipers, 2001). Put simply, there may be differences
between clinical and nonclinical groups other than in levels of
belief conviction, preoccupation, and distress.
One of the assessments did not show a dose–response relation-
ship to level of paranoia; limited data gathering in the reasoning
Table 3
Mean Scores and Group Comparisons for the Model Measures
Variable
Low paranoia
(n  30)
High nonclinical
paranoia (n  30)
Persecutory delusions
(n  30) Test of group effect
MS DMS D M S D F (2, 87) p
Anxiety 1.17
a 1.53 8.10
b 7.19 21.93
c 10.90 58.16 .001
Worry 36.53
a 13.30 49.83
b 11.48 58.96
c 13.96 22.73 .001
Interpersonal sensitivity 79.17
a 13.14 94.33
b 14.07 106.14
c 19.67 21.73 .001
Depression 2.47
a 3.90 10.00
b 10.52 26.63
c 11.17 54.89 .001
Anomalous perceptions
Total number 4.27
a 4.14 10.27
b 5.25 16.17
c 8.10 28.90 .001
Temporal lobe factor 1.17
a 1.32 3.60
b 2.09 5.96
c 3.07 33.18 .001
Chemosensation factor 1.53
a 1.74 3.13
b 1.98 2.79
b 2.36 5.10 .008
Sensory Intensity subscale 1.40
a 1.30 2.43
b 1.52 1.89
a,b 1.45 4.12 .020
Sensory Experience From Unexplained
Source subscale 0.57
a 0.94 1.67
b 1.18 3.20
c 1.73 29.87 .001
Beads task 7.83 4.69 9.70 5.68 5.28
a 4.26 6.01 .004
Number of traumatic events 1.17 1.56 2.43 1.76 4.77
a 3.63 16.09 .001
Note. Significant group differences (p  .05) are denoted by differing superscript letters.
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The data-gathering bias (“jumping to conclusions”) has been found
in studies with clinical and nonclinical groups to be specifically
associated with levels of delusional conviction (Freeman, Pugh, &
Garety, 2008; Garety et al., 2005). Delusional conviction was not
the focus of the current study, but the nonclinical paranoia group
will have had higher levels of belief conviction than the low
paranoia group on the screening measure of persecutory ideation.
Therefore a difference in data gathering would be expected, similar
to that reported by Freeman, Pugh, and Garety (2008). Van Dael et
al. (2006) also did not find an association of the reasoning bias
with nonclinical delusional ideation. Given the occasional failure
to replicate the jumping to conclusions finding in nonclinical
groups, it may well be that a range of more subtle and taxing
reasoning tasks are required to separate reliably nonclinical groups
high and low in delusional ideation. Alternatively, anxiety, worry,
and anomalous experiences may be enough on their own to create
moderately held thoughts of a paranoid content, and the extreme
data-gathering bias only operates to produce very high degrees of
belief conviction—an account which does not assume a simple
correlation between the continuum of paranoia and reasoning
biases. In the high nonclinical paranoia group the absence of a
hasty reasoning style is likely to be protective against the devel-
opment of severe paranoia by allowing doubt and the consideration
of alternative explanations for events.
The research study could have been strengthened in a number of
ways. The recruitment of a nonclinical group having comparable
levels of paranoia to the delusions group would have provided a
stronger test of differences between clinical and nonclinical experi-
ences. This would have entailed recruiting the top 5% of scorers on
the paranoia scale from the general population. Having four groups
varying in paranoia levels (i.e., sampling the putative spectrum at
more points) would have been informative. Improved matching on
age and intellectual functioning would have been desirable. It is also
of note that the initial leafleting had a very low response rate and
therefore the representativeness of the participant sample is unknown.
A central weakness is that the data collected in the current study do
not establish that the cognitive factors are linked to the occurrence of
persecutory ideation or rule out the possibility that they are secondary
consequences. Moving beyond a cross-sectional design in future
research would be particularly valuable; for instance, incorporating a
longitudinal element could have addressed the issue of whether the
factors from the cognitive model maintain persecutory ideation across
the spectrum. Manipulating key factors in each of the groups would
enable stronger causal inference (Kendler & Campbell, 2009; Shad-
ish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).
What are the broader implications of the continuum approach
for clinicians and researchers? More information, written with less
reference to diagnosis, is needed for those on the paranoia spec-
trum (Freeman, Freeman, & Garety, 2008). It is often helpful for
individuals with distressing persecutory thoughts to know that
their experiences are commoner than they had realized. The large
affective component to paranoid experience can be valuable to
recognize. Clinicians should be aware that paranoia is not inevi-
tably a sign of severe mental illness; a debate has already begun
concerning the introduction of a dimensional approach to psycho-
sis in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (Allardyce, Gaebel, Zielasek, & van Os, 2007;
Dutta et al., 2007). Importantly for researchers, the understanding
of persecutory delusions can be informed by studying milder
variants. Studying nonclinical variants has the advantages of fa-
cilitating the recruitment of large sample sizes in order to test
complex models, obviating complicating issues such as the pre-
scription of medication and appraisals of illness, and enabling
manipulationist experiments where putative causal factors are in-
creased. The continuum approach also implies that delusional
ideas can often be understood in terms of normal processes gone
awry rather than substantial deficits. Overall a focus is needed on
the individual experiences, the symptoms, which have hitherto
made up diagnoses such as schizophrenia.
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